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Foreword 	  
Corruption has always intrigued and annoyed me. It has been going on for so 
long and has become so much part of the everyday life in Brazil that most people don’t 
realize its immense dimensions, damages and consequences, such as poverty and 
inequality. It is the predatory and Darwinian aspects of man’s nature taken to their most 
extremes, and worse than that is the fact that the grand corrupt benefit from a system where 
impunity prevails. 
Brazil is a country where many of the socially included feel that those who are 
excluded are plain lazy and should just go get a job, an attitude that fosters the creation of a 
divided society of the haves and have-nots with the emergence of hate, violence, crime, 
drugs, and social fragmentation and distress. Brazilians abominate corruption but feel that 
it is more or less a disease that is part of the system. The general feeling is that these are 
issues to which there are no remedies, leaving a powerlessness and hopelessness sensation. 
The fact is that issues related to corruption are of such gravity that they should be a 
compulsory part of the curriculum of the primary, secondary, and higher education.  
Nonetheless, the dramatic levels of inequality caused by corruption that have 
evolved in the U.S. and Europe during the last few decades shed light on this problematic 
behavior that is now also affecting developed countries, which is something quite positive 
for Brazil to the extent that more people are involved in the solution. It has attracted the 
attention of the academia and of prominent economists such as Piketty, Stiglitz, Krugman, 
Krueger, Raj Chetty, Raghuram Rajan, Acemoglu, and many others. It has sent shock 
waves from Washington to all major centers around the world. It has also drawn the 
attention of numerous multilateral organizations, which have allocated their top economists 
and social scientists to work on the issue.  The proportion that the research and debates has 
taken is indeed overwhelming. Only a tsunami of such magnitude would be capable to 
draw such immense concerted effort to diagnose and find remedies to these problems that 
originate to a large extent on corruption.    
I have had contact with poverty and inequality for several years in several 
countries, mainly Brazil, Latin America, and the U.S., places where from one generation to 
another the poor are marginal human beings with no rights who struggle to meet their most 
basic needs.  Some people say that the “poor are happy” … no, they are absolutely not, 
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they are mere survivors since the day they were born. Across Brazil I have seen the poor 
take more than three hour trips in each direction to/from work starting at four in the 
morning with two to four switch overs in mass transit, in total fatigue compensating their 
lack of sleep inside buses, metros and trains … I have seen life in the favelas and in low 
income neighborhoods, homeless men and women, homeless and abandoned children, 
child prostitution, drugs, life in cracolandia1 in Sao Paulo, highly crowded inhuman jails, 
poor school and healthcare installations, poor quality public education, inadequate 
healthcare, ill-functioning sanitation and lack of infrastructure.   
Since circa 1975 I could increasingly fight inequality, poverty, and corruption in 
Brazil more intensively in the way I felt I could cause more impact, and that was through 
creating and preserving jobs. Following a cycle with Fortune 500 multinationals, I decided 
to work directly in solving large-scale corporate and banking problems and crises in Brazil 
– which increased substantially in 1990 due to the recession experienced by Brazil (-4.3% 
GDP) – reinvigorating and saving companies, which I referred to as “social cells” in one of 
my books, and combating different types of business and financial crimes, public and 
private. In late 1990’s I enhanced my engagement in the fight against corruption and fraud.  
The capital, Brasilia, is a case apart – there were several occasions in which I 
had to go to Brasilia on work and could closely see the dynamics of the three powers at the 
federal level, more frequently during Brazil’s Constitutional Reform in 1987/8 and the 
Reform of the Insolvency Law in 2004/5. However, the most unique episode in Brasilia 
happened during the short seven-month period in 1997 in which I worked in solving a 
major crisis that involved corruption and power games at the heart of the country.   
Corruption in Brazil also sweeps through the executive and legislative powers 
and is extensive to the judiciary – with widespread corruption it could not be otherwise. I 
saw numerous corruption schemes and abuse of power involving the government, congress, 
and the judiciary, and a lot of what happens behind the scenes, away from the public eye.  
It included but was not limited to state owned banks, large pension funds of state owned 
companies, state companies, regulatory agencies, etc. – at federal and state levels.    
                                                
1 Cracolandia is the land of crack which exists in different cities in Brazil. I visited Cracolandia in the old 
center of Sao Paulo a few times, ironically near Sao Paulo Supreme Court, and was totally shocked to see 
all those people and children with their crack stones smoking themselves to death. I could see the presence 
of the police but they were not there to protect the people – not too far from the police I could also see the 
drug dealers selling their crack very naturally and showing no concern with the officers. Cracolandia and 
Brazil’s prisons are true horror stories.     
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Corruption in the private sector involved, among others, kickback payments to 
giant natural resources public companies, large state companies’ pension funds, tax and 
financial schemes, bribing of tax authorities, bribing of government officials, illicit money 
transfers, trade misinvoicing, and shell companies.  The crisis projects on which I worked 
were a result of mismanagement and illicit practices, including shell banks and fraudulent 
activities. I was somewhat surprised by the fact that the Fortune 500 companies I worked 
and, which I had as a symbol of excellence in performance and ethics, were involved in 
corruption. I could see the difference between the hypocrisy of the discourses, value 
statements, the rule of law, and the facts. I could see the difference between the law and 
justice. I could also see the promiscuous relationship between the public and the private.  
These experiences had a great significance to my better understanding of the 
causes and consequences of corruption in Brazil and elsewhere.  Over and above what 
corruption crimes represent, the fact is that Brazil and other countries today suffer from a 
severe moral crisis that corrodes all institutions and their credibility. We read and watch the 
news and see almost daily, rules being bent, prevarication, twisted information, plain lies, 
false propaganda, tax evasions, frauds, money laundering, and corruption scandals, all 
involving high ranking officials from government, politics, judiciary, public entities, 
corporations and financial institutions. Brazil’s largest company and 30th in Fortune 500 
Global in 2014, state controlled Petrobras, is in the center of a scandal, with the ruling 
political party being investigated in Brazil and U.S. since 2014 for corruption crimes 
committed since 2002. There are just no limits to the greed of a few to the detriment of the 
less advantaged. 
Since founding the Brazilian Crisis Management Institute – Instituto Brasileiro 
de Gestao e Turnaround – in 2002 I have increasingly dedicated more time to research, 
writing and teaching.  Corruption, injustice, poverty, and inequality in Brazil have always 
caused me annoyance and are what motivated me to choose this theme for my research. I 
was also motivated by the fact that many researchers and the general public have only a 
vague idea of corruption in Brazil, and of the widespread damage it causes. Ever since 
always I was asked, “how can such a rich country have so much poverty?” and “why is 
there so much corruption in Brazil?” 
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In Brazilian politics I knew only one man who fiercely fought grand corruption, 
an honorable and incorruptible political leader, a true statesman and greatest orator I have 
seen in Brazil called Carlos Lacerda (1914-1977).     
In the investigation process of the thesis I found good and inspiring scientific 
literature and economic analysis on corruption, poverty, inequality, socioeconomic 
mobility, and a host of related variables, but nothing specifically related to the corruption 
syndrome in Brazil which has peculiarities not found in any other country.  
This and the empirical findings of my own odyssey of discovery are the 
contributions that I aim to provide with the present thesis.    
Jorge Queiroz
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Abstract 
Corruption in Brazil is endemic and has increased since the end of the military transition 
regime in 1985, a year marked by an indirect presidential election, which was followed by 
the 1988 Constitutional Reform. The present thesis answers the research question of “how 
corruption affects well-being in Brazil” by investigating the existing cause-effect 
relationships and complex dynamics and logic between corruption and related variables in 
Brazil, with each of the twenty-seven causal diagrams being analyzed individually. Among 
the key findings are that (i) a center role is played by the level of quality of institutions, (ii) 
high corruption is a symptom of a fundamental problem with the independence, quality and 
effectiveness of the judiciary, and that (iii) corruption is dominated by fast destructive 
reinforcing loops that can deteriorate quite rapidly if left unwatched, and improvement to 
lower corruption levels is characterized by feedback loops with long delays. The present 
thesis also recommends anti-corruption policies that can result in lower levels of corruption 
and in improved well-being. Among the several policies recommended are: stop impunity 
of the corrupt, close the loophole on the penal procedure code that allows corrupt criminals 
to escape serving jail time, introduce severe jail sentences to the corrupt, strengthen control 
of corruption, strengthen the procedure for nomination of Supreme Court Judges and to 
ensure the independence of the judiciary, introduce the study of corruption at all levels of 
the school curricula, introduce a political reform to stop reelection and to strengthen the 
electoral system to promote the election of non-corrupt representatives, introduce policies 
to strengthen the control of the black market for currencies and illicit financial flows, 
including money laundering, trade misinvoicing, anonymous companies, tax havens, bank 
secrecy and others – ultimately, allow Brazil to win the war against corruption.   
 
 
 
 
Keywords: corruption in Brazil, corruption, anti-corruption, anti-corruption policies, 
system dynamics, causal loop diagram, CLD, stock and flow, SFD.  
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1.  Introduction 
“The President abused one his most important powers … he offered it up [the 
presidential pardon] to wealthy fugitives whose money had already enabled them 
to permanently escape American justice. Few other abuses could so thoroughly 
undermine public trust in government.”2 
Most people have only a vague idea of what corruption in Brazil is and how 
much damage it causes, much less about the complex dynamics and logic involved, and 
the respective solutions. This is precisely where the present thesis aims to provide an 
original contribution to researchers, policy makers, practitioners, NGOs, donor agencies, 
and supra-national organizations, employing a system dynamics thinking approach.  
The socio-economic impact of corruption in Brazil is astounding – over 2.5% of 
GDP, US$35 to 50 billion3 stolen every year from poverty stricken Brazilians (in 
addition to 13% of GDP tax evasion). The present research is supported by several years 
of intense field experience “battling these [corruption and mismanagement] problems”, 
along the line advocated by Forrester (Forrester, 2013).  
In order to achieve this objective the present thesis investigates the causality 
between corruption’s key variables in Brazil, and recommends the policies that can be 
implemented to reduce corruption from its persisting high level. Hence the thesis 
hypothesis is: 
Corruption in Brazil negatively affects well-being of its society.   
There is much scientific work and economic analysis on corruption and related 
variables, an area that has attracted a great deal of interest from scholars, NGOs and 
multilateral organizations especially since the 1990s. Nonetheless, considering how long 
corruption has existed in human society and how long it has affected crucial 
                                                
2 United States Congressional Serial Set, No. 14778, House Report No. 454, Justice Undone – Clemency 
Decisions in Clinton White House, p. 107 – caused by the fact that Clinton granted a presidential pardon 
to billionaire fraudster and active fugitive from justice for nearly two decades, Marc Rich (and partner 
Pincus Green), founder of mining giant Glencore, largest Swiss company and 10th in Fortune 500 list, on 
his last day and hours before leaving the office, January 20, 2001, just as lights went out. 
3 Federation of Industries of Sao Paulo State. 
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socioeconomic variables, I believe that understanding of corruption and the various 
causalities is still embryonic.  
Part of the answers to Brazil’s high corruption is found in history. Brazil is a 
relatively young democracy that started out as a highly extractive and corrupt colony of 
Portugal, which lasted three centuries until 1822, before stabilizing at today’s level.  
Brazil has been stranded in a trap of a persistent and endemic corruption with a fixed 
wide gap with the more developed countries. Poor education performance (PISA)4, high 
levels of poverty and inequality, and prevailing impunity are perfect ingredients to foster 
increase in the number of corrupt representatives in government, congress and judiciary, 
at federal, state and municipal spheres. 
Corruption involves highly complex dynamics with long delays and inertia 
caused by an accumulation phenomenon, and is a serious obstacle to well-being and 
development. It exists only where and when there is a weak political and legal 
institutional structure, building quite a devastating vicious circle.5 
A wealth of literature demonstrates the relationships between corruption, 
growth, governance, inequality, poverty, human capital, infrastructure, politics, rule of 
law, informality, illicit activities, violence/drugs, and wars and it provides great detail of 
the amounts involved in the illicit transactions that on a world scale add up to over one 
trillion dollars each year, 3% of world GDP 6. 
Among important findings of this thesis is the fact that corruption in Brazil is 
dominated by fast destructive reinforcing loops and can deteriorate fast if left unwatched, 
and also that amelioration to lower level of corruption is characterized by feedback loops 
with long delays. 
Research has shown that system dynamicists have not ventured much in the 
study of corruption. Following a thorough investigation that included insights from 
(Sterman, 2000) and (Haraldsson & Sverdrup, 2005), and keeping in mind the intended 
                                                
4 Below average scoring in PISA tests and ranked 58th among 65 countries in 2012. 
5 (Abed & Davoodi, 2000; Barro, 2013; Eicher, Garcia-Penalosa, & van Ypersele, 2009; Kaufmann, 
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2014; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobaton, 1999; Lederman, Loayza, & Soares, 
2001; Mauro, 1995). 
6 (Hameed, Magpile, & Runde, 2014; Kar & LeBlanc, 2013; McNair et al., 2014) 
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value and usefulness the thesis wishes provide to policy makers, donor agencies and 
NGOs, I found that the most significant contribution that system dynamics can provide at 
this first stage, dully aligned with the thesis objective, is through the construction of a 
comprehensive and logical framework of corruption in Brazil that captures all major 
causal links and dynamics involved. Fulfillment of this first phase is conceived in 
program management and strategic planning as a critical and vital step that has to be 
consolidated before well-founded computer modeling can be pursued in a second stage, 
in continuation to the present research.  
The thesis starts with the analysis of the problematic behavior and methodology 
used as laid out in chapters 1 and 2. It continues by describing the hypothesis and 
analysis of the cause of the problems in chapters 3 and 4. Recommended policies and 
implementation are outlined in chapter 5 with the conclusion presented in chapter 6.     
2. Problematic Behavior 
2.1 Description 
Commencing during the mid-1990s, several organizations have developed a 
perception based corruption index across a wide range of countries to quantitatively 
assess the pervasiveness of corruption. Given the importance of corruption on the policy 
agenda, literature has dedicated increasing attention to the issue. These indices contain a 
high degree of abstraction, which is justified because the actual level of corruption in a 
country is difficult to observe, and also due to the high level of secrecy and complexity 
employed in the legal and financial structures of grand corruption. They have been 
widely used by researchers in econometric studies as a dependent variable when 
exploring the causes of corruption or as an explanatory variable when investigating its 
consequences. Among the organizations that have developed corruption indices are the 
World Bank/Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), Transparency International, and 
Political Risk Services Inc. that produces a variety of reports including the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the Political Risk Services Country Reports (PRSCR).  
Analyzing the WGI (Kaufmann et al., 2014) we can clearly see that rich, 
developing, and poor countries’ corruption perception levels fluctuate in bands or 
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intervals at certain plateaus of low, high and very high corruption – Brazil for instance 
has been trapped in the range between 4.8 and 5.2 in a scale of 1 to 10 with no worsening 
or improvement trend (see fig. 1) since 1995.  
 
                                     Figure 17 (0 min. – 10 max. corruption) 
Nevertheless, this rather flat behavior of WGI's corruption index for Brazil 
strongly suggests that it did not capture the dramatic worsening in corruption with the 
accompanying scandals that occurred in Brazil starting in 2002.  In fact, recent research 
has challenged the goodness of perception based indicators, arguing they might not be 
good indicators of actual corruption.8 In this same direction, a structural equation model 
was employed by (Dreher et al., 2007) using data from the mid-1970s to late 1990s of 
measurable variables that indicate and cause corruption to verify whether corruption 
increased or decreased – on a scale where minimum corruption was set at minus one (-1) 
and a maximum at plus one half (+0.5), showing Switzerland as the least corrupt country 
with an index of -0.91 in the period 1991-1997, Brazil’s corruption index was shown to 
have increased from 0.0601 in the period 1976-1980, to 0.1271 in 1981-1985, to 0.1271 
1986-1990, to 0.225 in 1991-1997. However, it did not show how corruption evolved 
post-1997. Nevertheless, the corruption events which evolved in Brazil from 1976 to 
                                                
7 The original index has been rescaled so that the higher values represent higher levels of corruption. 
8 (Abramo, 2005; Andvig, Fjeldstad, Amundsen, Sissener, & Søreide, 2000; Dreher, Kotsogiannis, & 
McCorriston, 2007; Mocan, 2004; Søreide, 2005; Svensson, 2005). 
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1997 corroborate with the behavior compiled by (Dreher et al., 2007), with a sharper 
increase in post-2002 years. These aspects will need to be considered when entering the 
computer modeling and simulation stage in further research. 
It is worth noting that the existing literature seems to presume that corruption 
increased long ago from some point in time before it started being measured in the 1990s. 
However, history shows us precisely the opposite, despite not being yet measured from 
the 16th to 19th centuries and earlier. The history of Europe, for instance, shows that 
corruption was higher and a major problem, and that it actually went down to the present 
levels before it started being measured. European nations worked their way out of 
centralized monarchical aristocracies to stronger, more participative and egalitarian, 
politico-economic institutions. Corruption was certainly higher in Brazil’s colonial 
(1530-1822) and imperial times (1822-1889) – how it arrived and stabilized at current 
levels is not recorded.   
Historical events suggest that the larger scale immigration waves from different 
European countries which took place in Brazil in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries contributed to the gradual strengthening of Brazil’s politico-economic 
institutions, notwithstanding the fact that grand corruption continued to haunt Brazil 
throughout the twentieth century until present. This leads to the research question, which 
will be expanded in the hypothesis in the next sections. 
Research question: “How does corruption affect well-being in Brazil?”  
As indicated, Brazil’s corruption history suffered a major blow in the beginning 
of this century with a strong retrogression, starting in 2002. From what was an already 
high, more or less stable level of corruption, corruption worsened in an unprecedented 
way, getting totally out of control by early 2015, taking Brazil to last place among the 61 
countries included in the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) 
rank for bribery and corruption in 2015 World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY).  The 
increase in corruption was followed by the worsening in Brazil’s overall competitiveness 
where it fell to 56th place in 2015, from the 38th position in 2009, and in government 
effectiveness where it fell to 60th place from 52nd in 2009. (IMD, 2015)  
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A government led, politically and ideologically motivated, grand corruption 
scheme was promoted under the leadership of a newly elected (2002) labor union leader, 
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (Lula), who was reelected for the 2006-2010 period, making 
his successor, former left-activist in 1960s, Dilma Rousseff for the two subsequent 
periods 2010-2014 and 2014-2018. Together, they orchestrated the largest, and first and 
only corruption scheme in Brazil’s history involving amounts without parallel to ensure 
their permanent domination project9 funneling several $billions to their political party 
(Workers Party) and to the personal enrichment of several of their relatives and 
contributors, and even if indirectly, their own.  Ironically Lula’s campaign speech in 
2002 election was one of eradication of corruption in Brazil.  
These grand corruption schemes involved major state controlled companies 
including oil giant monopoly Petrobras (Petrolao10 and Lava Jato11), Brazil Mail 
(“Correios”), Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), Public Pension Funds, 
questionable and non-transparent financing to Cuba, Venezuela and other Latin 
American and African nations. Lula’s government also led a major scheme (Mensalao) 
to bribe congress representatives to approve their proposals. Furthermore, the former 
Chief of Staff of the President is among the suspects in a gigantic corruption scheme 
involving the Brazilian Tax Revenue Service.12 Petrobras fell from 30th (5th in 2008) 
largest company in the world to 416th. Its market value fell from US$ 87 billion to US$ 
44 billion from 2014 to 2015.13 
The presidencies of Lula and Rousseff turned it into a typical “bread and 
circus” populist system. Indirectly, they managed to control congress and the judiciary 
violating Brazil’s rule of law principle.  
Corruption reached a threshold that caused a large scale institutional crisis – a 
‘perfect storm’ that lead to the largest mass demonstration in Brazil’s history with over 
two million people demanding the ousting of Rousseff on March 15 and April 12, 2015, 
                                                
9  Programa Roda Viva, March 23, 2015. 
10 Petrolao refers to the Petrobras’ corruption trials at Brazil’s Supreme Court  
11 Operação Lava Jato (Operation Car Wash) is an investigation related to the Petrobras’ multi-billion 
corruption scandal that is being carried out by a Federal Judge in the city of Curitiba since March 17, 
2014.  
12 Called Operação Zelotes 
13 Forbes Magazine. 
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in addition to countrywide pots and pans protests (panelaco14). Furthermore former 
president Lula is being investigated by the Center of Combat of Corruption of the Office 
of the Prosecutor General for the crime of national and international traffic of influence 
perpetrated following the end of his second presidential mandate between 2011 and 2014 
along the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) that granted at least US$ 4.1 billion in 
financing to different countries such as Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ghana and 
Venezuela to benefit Brazil’s largest construction company Odebrecht – over US$ 30 
billion/year in revenues, which received almost US$ 847 million in international lines of 
preferential credit from BNDES 15. 
Over and above the reversal imposed on their populist power plan by the 
turmoil originated in their government’s grand corruption scandals, their plan was also 
hurt by Brazil’s economic downturn as a consequence of the end of the commodities 
boom. 
2.2. Methodology 
Conceptual analysis is the starting point of the modeling process and the causal 
loop diagram (CLD) method was found to best illustrate and communicate the structure 
of the corruption problem in Brazil to policy makers, donor agencies and NGOs at the 
first stage, dully supported by extensive research of existing literature in a way to provide 
for empirical validation of the major relationships.  It is based on the understanding that 
the exploration of the corruption problem applying the system dynamics methodology 
needs to follow an organized, careful and logical pattern to be successful.  
Although model building is an iterative process, to deal with such a complex 
problem that corruption in Brazil represents, the thesis rationale is aligned with the 
prescribed by (Haraldsson & Sverdrup, 2005), whereby well-founded qualitative models 
such as CLD, precedes the step of constructing a simulation in a computer. CLD is also 
seen as a good tool for mental model communication between persons with different 
ethnic, cultural and academic background. (Sterman, 2000) supports this line of thought 
to the extent that he believes CLD is a good tool for conceptualization. CLD and SFD 
                                                
14 Panelaco are major social protests made by beating on pots and pans and other metal utensils.  
15 Revista Epoca, Brazil, May 1, 2015. 
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can be developed simultaneously but considering the high complexity involved in the 
research and analysis of corruption, and the fact that system dynamicists have not 
ventured much in the study of corruption (Ullah, 2012), it was found that a better 
approach would be to start by first concentrating attention and immersing in a detailed 
investigation of the literature, empirical data and in a CLD analysis, and secondly pursue 
SFD and computer modeling in a continuing research, in order not to put at risk the 
quality of the thesis results. 
The thesis employs a research intensive approach consisting of: (a) construction 
of a clear vision – following a thorough research and critical review of the existing 
literature and empirical data and system dynamics concepts and applications (Sterman, 
2000), the vision of the approach and structure of the thesis became more crystalline and 
consolidated; (b) development of conceptualization and substance – in sequence it was 
seen as vital that the thesis developed a good content and foundation, creating a solid 
understanding of the dynamics of corruption together with the delays and accumulations 
involved; and (c) harmonize the different disciplines in one language – system dynamics, 
economics, political science, sociology, politics, law, taxes, illicit transactions, fraud, and 
history among others.  
3. Hypothesis overview 
There is a strong negative association between income levels and corruption. 
Many economic experts view grand corruption as one of the most threatening and 
pervasive obstacles to alleviating global poverty, and as a major detriment to 
development particularly in low-income countries.  The hypothesis for the causes and 
consequences of the corruption problem was developed using the methodology described 
above. 
The causal diagram snapshot structure shown in figure 2 summarizes the key 
hypothesized cause and effect relationships involved in the corruption process in Brazil. 
Its causal links are corroborated by the findings of renowned researchers together with 
empirical findings and will be discussed in detail together with each of the 27 loops in 
the next chapter.                
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                  Figure 2 – Corruption Causal Loop Diagram Structure (Snapshot) 
                    ___________ Positive Polarity   _ _ _ _ _ _ Negative Polarity              
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The corruption dynamics is strongly impacted by seven dominating loops of a 
reinforcing nature:  (i) R1 – Corruption-Institutions loop; (ii) R2 – R2.1 – Inequality-
Poverty loop and R2.2 – Poverty-Populism loop; (iii) R3 – Trading in influence loop; (iv) 
R4 – Corruption-Accountability loop; (v) R5 – Public Sector loop; (vi) R6 – Informal 
economy loop; and (vii) R7 – Black Market loop. These 7 loops break into 18 reinforcing 
loops. 
The existing balancing forces are represented by four major balancing loops: (i) 
B1 – Strong institutions loop; and three growth related loops: (ii) B2 – Private 
investments loop; (iii) B3 – Public investments loop; and (iv) B4 – Human capital loop. 
These 4 loops expand into 9 balancing loops. 
The corruption dynamics in Brazil is characterized by reinforcing loops that 
turn rather fast and by long and slow balancing feedback loops, a fact that aggravates the 
corruption problem in Brazil.  Thus far, the balancing loops have not been sufficiently 
strong to override the force of the seven dominating destructive loops and explain why 
corruption in Brazil persists at a high level, between the rich and less developed 
countries.   
4. Analysis of Hypothesis  
The major cause and effect relationships that drive the corruption process are 
represented in the causal loop diagram structures described in this chapter and were 
extensively analyzed and supported by existing literature – research of the relationship 
between corruption and major variables such as trading in influence, populism, 
investment, income per capita, institutions/governance, informal/underground economy, 
poverty, education, taxes, illegal transactions, and judiciary. 
The analysis herein will describe each of the 18 reinforcing and 9 balancing 
loops contained in the causal diagram snapshot of figure 2 together with the respective 
variables and causal links.  It is worthy noting that in the dynamic structures represented 
in this thesis it is common for variables to be part of one or more loops. It is also 
important to bear in mind that there are feedbacks, delays (responses are not 
instantaneous) and accumulations (and inertia) involved in these dynamics that are many 
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times unseen by policy makers, practitioners and researchers; this thesis provides this 
understanding, which is needed to avoid frequent policy errors and short-termism.  These 
dynamics will generate resulting behaviors in accordance to the forces of the positive and 
negative loops and the effectiveness of the existing and recommended policies. Causal 
diagram is an extraordinary tool to aid in the analysis and design of strategies to reduce 
corruption before computer modeling can be experimented for projections and 
simulations.      
The ‘corruption-level of quality of institutions’ is the single most destructive 
causal link in the corruption dynamics. Level of institutional accountability and quality 
of the electoral system are seen among of the strongest variables that can reduce and 
control corruption as identified in the literature investigated, which corroborates with 
how corruption has been evolving in Brazil since 2002. These two streams of variables 
converge and meet at the quality of institutions variable with reinforcing and balancing 
opposing forces characterized by R1 and B1 and discussed in section 4.2 and 4.7 
respectively. (See Figures 5 and 6) 
4.1. Direct causes and consequences of corruption 
John Sterman (2000, pp. 189-190) highlighted that causes are usually found in 
the structure and policies of the system, reason why prior to proceeding with the analysis 
of each individual loop herein it is important to show two partial diagrams containing the 
key variables that (i) directly cause increases and decreases in the level of corruption and 
(ii) those key variables that are direct consequences of corruption, as illustrated in figures 
3 and 4. 
These two graphical representations breaking down the direct interdependencies 
of corruption variable in Brazil facilitate the visualization of the structure and forces of 
the variables involved, and consequently provide a better understanding when each loop 
is discussed from section 4.2 onwards. 
(i) Direct Drivers of Corruption  
As can be seen in figure 3 there are eight variables that, together and directly, 
drive the changes in the level of corruption in Brazil: (i) populism, (ii) trading in 
influence, (iii) size of the public sector, (iv) regulatory efficiency, (v) number of taxes 
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and rates, (vi) informal economy, (vii) institutional accountability, and (viii) black 
market for currency.  Level of quality of institutions is a key variable that will influence 
and help determine the levels of these eight different causal variables. The levels of 
human capital/education and poverty will help determine the levels of populism and 
informal economy. 
 
                                             Figure 3 – Direct Drivers of Corruption 
                   ___________ Positive Polarity   _ _ _ _ _ _ Negative Polarity 
 
 (ii) Direct Effects of Corruption 
As shown in figure 4 there are ten variables that are partially a consequence of 
the levels of corruption in Brazil: (i) black market for currency, (ii) government tax 
revenue / public investment / public expenditures in human capital, (iii) private 
investment, (iv) inequality / GDP per capita, (v) poverty, (vi) level of punishment / 
ousting of the corrupt / level of elections (non-corrupt), (vii) institutional accountability, 
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(viii) level of quality of institutions, (ix) size of public sector, and (x) level of trading in 
influence.   
 
 
                                                 Figure 4 – Direct Effects of Corruption 
                        ___________ Positive Polarity   _ _ _ _ _ _ Negative Polarity 
4.2. Corruption-[Quality of] Institutions/Governance reinforcing loops – R1 group 
of loops   
The R1 group of loops consists of six loops, R1.1 to R1.6: 
Loop R1.1 – Corruption-institutions fast reinforcing and dominating loop   
Trading in influence is among the major direct causes of corruption, and is a 
consequence of weak institutions/governance. Corruption is a deep-rooted variable that 
has always been present in Brazil, acting directly to undermine the quality of its 
institutions, its central nervous system, and spreading over its complete governing 
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structure, contaminating its rule of law and welfare state. The dynamics of these three 
variables reinforce one another creating a revolving effect that form the R1.1 loop.  
 
                                                 Figure 5 – Loops R1.1 and B1.1 
                        ___________ Positive Polarity   _ _ _ _ _ _ Negative Polarity 
It is important to note that reinforcing and balancing forces meet at the quality 
of institutions/governance variable. The archetype of the reinforcing loop R1.1 is its fast-
turning nature, stimulating the increase of corruption due the existing direct endogenous 
relation between corruption-quality of institutions, quality of institutions-trading in 
influence and trading in influence-corruption. The balancing loop B1.1 in turn is 
characterized by its slow-turning nature and is discussed in section 4.7.  
This is very visible in the case of Brazil with corruption starting with the 
government and expanding to congress and the judiciary, spreading through 26 states and 
over 5.000 municipalities throughout the whole country. 
The determining variable in this loop is the trading in influence variable – it is 
where a good part of grand political corruption originates, and as such is individually 
explored in section 4.4 where the trading in influence reinforcing loop R3 is discussed in 
greater detail.   
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                            Figure 6 – Converging dominating loops R1 and B1 
                         ___________ Positive Polarity   _ _ _ _ _ _ Negative Polarity 
Loop R1.2 – Corruption-institutions-informal and underground economy reinforcing 
loop 
Numerous research papers link corruption to the size of the informal economy 
through corruption weakened institutions.16 Informality is an economic phenomenon that 
in its higher levels, such as seen in Brazil, where the informal economy corresponds to 
                                                
16 (Dreher et al., 2007; Dreher & Schneider, 2006; Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, & Zoido-Lobaton, 
2000; Hibbs & Piculescu, 2005; Hindriks, Keen, & Muthoo, 1999; Johnson, Kaufmann, & Zoido-
Lobaton, 1999). 
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40% of GDP (Arvate, Lucinda, & Schneider, 2004), is also associated with poverty and 
tax evasion. 
The essence of the informal and underground economy in Brazil are activities 
that aimed at not paying taxes and circumventing the law, and as a result corruption is 
intrinsic to the nature of this grey or unofficial area of the economy. This area includes 
illicit cross-border transactions, money laundering, all sorts of smuggling, stolen 
merchandize, narcotraffic, among others. Informality and underground economy will be 
analyzed further in section 4.9 where the informal economy and tax loops are addressed 
(R6.1 to R6.6). 
Loop R1.3 – Corruption-institutions-populism reinforcing loop   
Populist governments in Latin America are known for their efforts in the 
direction of a totalitarian regime. Brazil is a relatively young and still fragile democracy 
that since 2002 has been governed by a populist regime with a communist ideology, 
despite being democratically elected, and corruption has gotten totally out of control, 
spreading throughout the executive and legislative with the government having managed 
to indirectly control part of the judiciary as discussed in section 4.3 under poverty-
populism loop R2.2. 
Loop R1.4 – Corruption-institutions-number of taxes and rates loop  
Corruption in Brazil also fosters the increase in the number of taxes and rates in 
its effort to cover government inefficiencies and oversize, and costs of corruption. Brazil 
is known for having one of the greatest numbers of taxes in the world and one of the 
highest overall effective tax rates. Over 36.3% of all wealth Brazil generated in 201217 
(up from 22.5% in 1987 in the beginning of the re-democratization period and 30% in 
2002)18 was transferred from the productive to the unproductive sector (the government) 
without the corresponding return in services and infrastructure. An excessive number of 
taxes and rates also causes an increase in the informal economy, with several 
                                                
17 OECD and Veja Jan 2014. http://veja.abril.com.br/noticia/economia/carga-tributaria-brasileira-cresce-
933-em-dois-anos/. 
18 Instituto Brasileiro de Planejamento Tributario (IBPT) and 
http://veja.abril.com.br/idade/exclusivo/impostos-carga-tributaria/contexto2_g1.html. 
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consequences that will be further analyzed in loops R6.1 to R6.6 in section 4.9, among 
them a high tax evasion of 13% of Brazil’s GDP.19 
Loop R1.5 – Corruption-institutions-size of public sector loop   
The start of the re-democratization period in 1986 marked the use of bigger 
government in Brazil with ministries used as a bargaining tool in exchange of political 
support – one of the prices that Brazil, as a young democracy, is paying. This is 
elaborated further in section 4.6 Public Sector loop R5.   
Loop R1.6 – Corruption-institutions-regulatory efficiency loop  
Researchers observe a positive association between corruption and excessive 
government regulation.20  Brazil has always been a country with a high regulatory 
burden in all areas starting with a large number of tax regulations related to its many 
taxes and duties, company registries, notaries all over to certify even a simple photocopy 
or a signature.21  In addition to causing corruption, this excessive number of regulations 
pushes several people and companies to the informal and underground economy, and put 
pressure to increase corruption further.      
The destructive forces of these aforementioned loops (R1.1 to R1.6) can be 
outweighed by the balancing forces of good governance and of checks and balances of a 
democratic system, which will be explored in section 4.7 elaborating about strong 
institutions balancing loop.  
4.3. Corruption-Inequality-Poverty-Populism dominating reinforcing loops – R2.1 
and R2.2 
                                                
19 Valor Economico November 9, 2013.  http://www.valor.com.br/brasil/3333552/no-mundo-brasil-so-
perde-para-russia-em-sonegacao-fiscal-diz-estudo. 
20 (Ades & Di Tella, 1997, 1999; Djankov, La Porta, & Shleifer, 2002; Goel & Nelson, 2005; Svensson, 
2005; Treisman, 2000).  
21 The number of notaries in Brazil and the large number of people involved in this bureaucratic 
rubberstamping activity is overwhelming.  
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                 Figure 7 – R2.1 Inequality-Poverty loop / R2.2 Poverty-Populism loop  
                       ___________ Positive Polarity   _ _ _ _ _ _ Negative Polarity 
Loop R2.1 – Inequality-Poverty loop  
a) Corruption-Growth/GDP per capita  
International organizations such as the World Bank have identified corruption 
as ‘the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development’ and estimated that 
corruption would reach conservatively US$ 1 trillion each year – which corresponds to 
the size of the GDP of Norway and Sweden together.  Furthermore, the World Bank has 
estimated that with such levels of corruption countries that tackle corruption, improve 
governance and the rule of law could increase per capita incomes by a staggering 400 
percent (Dreher et al., 2007).  Empirical results show that corruption lowers investment 
and, as a result economic growth (Gupta, Davoodi, & Terme, 1998; Mauro, 1995). 
(Li, Xu, & Zou, 2000) found that even after correcting for measurement errors, 
corruption still retards economic growth.  (Mo, 2001) also analyzes the effect of 
corruption on economic growth noting that the most important channel through which 
corruption affects economic development is political instability. Literature has shown 
that, through a growth related chain going through investments, that corruption reduces 
growth and that the causality is unidirectional from corruption to growth.  
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b) Corruption-Inequality causality 
Researchers including (Gupta et al., 1998) have shown that corruption is one of 
the major causes of inequality through its impact on human capital formation, and 
unequal access to education. Tests show that a worsening of the corruption index by one 
standard deviation (2.52 points on a scale of 0 to 10) is associated with an increase in the 
Gini coefficient of about 4.4 points, which is considered quite representative (fig. 8). 
(Tanzi, 1995) argued that the benefits from corruption are likely to be accumulated by the 
better-connected who belong mostly to high-income groups.  (Li et al., 2000) found that 
corruption alone also explains a large proportion of the Gini differential across 
developing and rich countries.  
 
   Low Corruption                                                                                                                       High Corruption 
       Figure 8 – Vertical axis – Adjusted Gini Coefficient22 versus 
                                  Horizontal axis – Corruption Index (0 to 10)  
                                          (Gupta et al., 1998)23 
                                                
22 Gini coefficient is adjusted using regression results. 
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Loop R2.2 – Poverty-Populism loop 
a) Corruption-poverty causality 
Corruption is Brazil’s number one cause of poverty. It is attested by history and 
endorsed by different organizations such as the World Bank and the signatories of the 
New Haven Declaration on Human Rights and Financial Integrity24.  It is the worst and 
most irreparable crime committed against people in Brazil causing insurmountable socio-
economic destruction – destruction of the social tissue, starvation, poverty, inequality, 
unemployment, social exclusion, violence, social unrest, drug/weapons trafficking, lack 
of infrastructure, adequate education, health, sanitation and water. It usurps the right to 
life and dignity of millions of children, women, men, and the elderly. Incommensurable 
and irreparable damages, wide and deep are caused.   
Corruption negatively affects poverty, unemployment and sub-employment 
through various channels, including growth, biased tax systems, and poor targeting of 
social programs (Gupta et al., 1998). Tests showed that a one-standard deviation in the 
growth rate of corruption (a deterioration of 0.78 percentage points) is associated with a 
decline in income growth of the bottom 20% of the population of 1.6 percentage points 
per year (fig.9).  
(Gupta et al., 1998) also claim that corruption’s impact on poverty is 
considerable for two important reasons: (i) since corruption reduces growth it also 
decreases the rate of poverty reduction; and (ii) since corruption increases income 
inequality, it will also reduce growth and consequently limit poverty reduction. They also 
show that corruption not only reduces the income growth of the poor directly, but also 
indirectly through lower social spending. They conclude that policies that reduce 
corruption will also reduce income inequality and poverty.  
Poverty and inequality, in turn, generate violence, crime, and social and 
political instability (Crutchfield & Wadsworth, 2003; Muggah, 2012), which create 
uncertainty thus negatively affecting private investments and development.   
                                                                                                                                           
23 The income inequality regression is estimated using OLS on cross-country data for 1980-1987.  
24 http://www.gfintegrity.org/press-release/gfi-releases-new-haven-declaration-step-forward-fight-human-
rights/ 
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    Figure 9 – Vertical axis – Income Growth of Bottom 20% Population versus              
                      Horizontal axis – Growth in the Corruption Index (-2.5 to +2.0)  
                                             (Gupta et al., 1998)25 
b) Corruption-poverty-populism causalities 
Populist style governments have a direct causal nexus with corruption. 
Populism is an enduring feature of Latin American politics. In fact, there has recently 
been a resurgence of ‘‘populist’’ politicians in several developing countries, particularly 
in Latin America. The label populist is often used to emphasize that these politicians use 
a rhetoric that aggressively defends the interests of the common man against the 
privileged elite (Acemoglu, Egorov, & Konstantin, 2013).26  
The recurrent pattern of the paternalistic leader – the “savior of the country” – 
who plays upon the masses is embedded in the Latin American public culture and still 
fragile democracies. Cultural values favor the development of unscrupulous leader who 
                                                
25 Ibid. 23. 
26 The American Heritage Dictionary defines populism as ‘‘a political philosophy supporting the rights 
and power of the people in their struggle against the privileged elite.’’ See 
http://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=populism. 
Corruption – Can Brazil win this war? –  Jorge Queiroz  –  2015                                  22  
claims to represent the workers and poor, the “common people”, the “ordinary people” or 
simply “our people”. Populism in Latin America has structural, as well as cultural roots – 
populism with ideological underpinnings (Armony, 2005).  
In Latin America, the populist politicians quest to power is based on 
segregation and totalitarianism – to achieve their goal they resort to a hate speech in 
order to promote the division the society, “people” and “anti-people” – the [less 
advantaged] “people” are good, honest, hardworking and the “anti-people” are the elite 
that explore the “people” (Alvarez, 2014).  Populism usurps the individual rights of 
people. Alvarez states that the issue is not left versus right as emphasized by populist 
leaders in Latin America, but rather populism versus [democratic] republic since the 
[democratic] republic is what guarantees the institutions, the rule of law. She quotes 
Mariano Grondona27 who wrote: “Populism loves so much the poor that it multiplies 
them”, in other words, populism promotes the culture of social transfers also known as 
“bread and circus”. 
Notwithstanding the above, outside the public eye populist leaders in Brazil for 
instance establish close ties with the dominant economic elite often involving rather 
secretive deals as seen in case of former president Lula.  
Literature also demonstrates (Glaeser, 2012) that there is a strong causal nexus 
between populism and corruption.  Corruption exists under any political ideology but is 
enhanced under any sort of totalitarian regime. Populism is power driven and utilizes any 
means, both licit and illicit, to secure the fulfillment of its permanent power project – the 
experience of the last 12 years under populist regime in Brazil has made this very 
crystalline with the outrageous and unprecedented levels of widespread political 
corruption it articulated.  
Populist political leaders are charismatic, personalistic, and paternalistic and use 
these characteristics to gather support from a large numbers of followers (Weyland, 
2001).  Elections, mass demonstrations, and opinion polls are the crucial instruments 
with which populist leaders mobilize and demonstrate their distinctive capacity. 
                                                
27 Argentinean sociologist, political scientist and journalist.   
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Populism is depicted by a combination of political demagoguery, organizational 
instability, economic irresponsibility, and excessive distributive generosity.  
The high levels of poverty and inequality in Brazil are breeding grounds to 
populist political platforms. But populist rhetoric and policies are frequently to the left of 
the median voter’s preferences, and such policies may arguably harm rather than help the 
majority of the population (Acemoglu et al., 2013). 
Brazil’s former president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of the Workers Party, Hugo 
Chavez and Maduro of Venezuela, and other Latin American presidents fall into this 
category. Lula who always used Brazil’s unions as a base for mass mobilization, created 
the “Fome Zero” (zero hunger) and “Bolsa Familia” (family allowance) following his 
election in 2002. The “bread and circus” programs that worked well during the 
commodities’ boom of Lula’s first and second term in office from 2002 to 2010, did not 
work so well for his successor of the Workers Party, Dilma Rousseff, after the end of the 
commodity boom, more so, following her reelection in 2014, due to the adverse 
economic environment because lower growth leads to lower tax revenues/company 
contributions and less money to fund the government’s populist initiatives.  This episode 
in Brazil has shown that in order for populism to work, in addition to fragile institutions, 
economic conditions also have to be favorable – the pressure on corrupt activities is 
exacerbated when the economy is not performing so well. 
Brazil’s presidencies since 2002, more than preceding ones, use the 
constitutional and voluntary transfers of money to municipalities to exert pressure over 
the mayors, which are characterized as a form of institutional corruption, so that they 
support the federal government programs – “friendlier” mayors get more money.  In 
addition they use major advertising by state controlled companies as a means to control 
the freedom of the press of television and other media in what regards the government – 
including government propaganda broadly speaking.  
c) Corruption- Poverty-Social Transfers causality 
According to (Schneider & Enste, 2000) and others corruption directly impacts 
social transfer programs, more so in lower growth periods such as Brazil is undergoing in 
the past few years and enhanced in 2015 with budget for social programs being forcedly 
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cut, and negatively impacting what represents former and current president’s most 
favorite populist tools among poverty stricken Brazilians. During recessions the causality 
between corruption and social transfers is aggravated. 
Former President Lula’s major policy in 2002, which was also adopted by his 
successor Rousseff enhanced social assistance,28 considered a major force in election 
campaigns.  Despite high level of corruption, this policy worked quite well during the 
commodity boom spearheaded by China. Brazil’s social assistance programs represented 
a disincentive to those receiving the family allowance payments to search for work and 
also led these families to disregard the corruption scandals such as Mensalao.29  
4.4. Trading in Influence dominating reinforcing loop – R3  
Corruption and Lobbying, Trading in Influence, and Campaign Contributions 
causality 
 
                    Figure 10 – R3 Trading in influence dominating reinforcing loop 
                     ___________ Positive Polarity   _ _ _ _ _ _ Negative Polarity 
‘Corruption-trading in influence’ reinforcing loop has a two-way causality. 
(Campos & Giovannoni, 2006) state that much literature claim that lobbying is just a 
special form of corruption focused on legislative bodies or rule-making bodies.30 In their 
                                                
28 Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) and Bolsa Familia (Family Allowance). 
29 Monthly “payments” made by former President Lula’s government to representatives of congress to support the 
government proposals. 
30 Professor Juan Cole has written about major forms of trading in influence in the U.S. and the numbers are 
astronomical http://www.juancole.com/2013/12/corrupt-country-world.html  
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empirical research they found there is substantial evidence that lobbying and corruption 
are in fact substitutes in transition economies such as Brazil.  
Lobbying, trading in influence including campaign contribution activities, 
political nominations to key positions in state controlled corporations, nepotism, etc. in 
Brazil are among the key vehicles through which grand corruption is perpetrated – 
together with bribing of politicians, government officials, members of the judiciary and 
regulatory agents, they generate a phenomenon that in economics is called the race to the 
bottom and that makes reinforcing loops a strong dominating force in the model. The 
interrelations of these activities with corruption have been studied by several scholars 
including (Campos & Giovannoni, 2006; Coate & Morris, 1999; Dahm & Porteiro, 2004; 
Damania, Fredricksson, & Mani, 2004; Grossman & Helpman, 2001; Harstad & 
Svensson, 2005; Yalcin & Damania, 2005). These activities are home for a host of illicit 
financial transactions in Brazil, both on and offshore. 
One empirical example is the colossal government corruption scandal involving 
Brazil’s largest state controlled mixed capital oil giant monopoly Petrobras, which has 
shares listed on the Sao Paulo and New York Stock Exchanges. It was orchestrated since 
2002 and revealed starting in 2014.   
It essentially worked with the government nominating Petrobras’ officials to 
key positions of board of directors and management who in turn coordinated the grand 
corruption scheme along contractors. The money defrauded from Petrobras went to the 
self-enrichment of many and to the Workers Party to fund their power perpetuating 
campaigns. All the costs of over-invoicing and inefficiencies where borne by society 
through price increases. The disclosure of the corruption scheme generated a wide array 
of consequences: high risk of impeachment of the president; heavy criminal charges and 
arrests of a long list of suspects – included among the 49 politicians in the lava jato31 
judicial investigations are the leaders of the Senate and of the Chamber of 
Representatives, and former president who was impeached in 1992 for corruption and 
                                                
31 Ibid. 11. 
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now senator Fernando Collor de Mello32; a chain of losses are imposed on Petrobras, 
workers, suppliers, investors including large pension funds of state owned companies due 
to the collapse of the share price; legal claims filed against Petrobras, among others33 – 
this corruption scheme is represented by the causal diagram of figure 11.  
 
                                      Figure 11 – CLD – Petrobras corruption scheme 
In the realm of lobbying, special interests and contributions also lies rent-
seeking activity including those of financial markets – private financial institutions such 
as banks and investors (Khwaja & Mian, 2011) – and natural resources. Research shows 
that corruption and rent-seeking are typically consequences of weak institutions. It 
includes the politically connected firms that obtain rents from government banks in the 
form of preferential lending in terms of greater access to giant credit at a lower price, at 
times involving mega defaults – they are also more likely to be bailed out by the state. 
(Dinc, 2005; Sapienza, 2004) demonstrate that government bank lending in developing 
                                                
32 Revista Veja and O Estado de São Paulo March 6, 2015.  http://veja.abril.com.br/noticia/brasil/lista-do-
petrolao-reune-cupula-do-congresso-e-partidos/,  http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-
macedo/veja-a-lista-dos-deputados-e-senadores-sob-suspeita-da-lava-jato/ . 
33 The Betrayal of Brazil, Bloomberg, May 8, 2015. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-05-
08/brazil-s-massive-corruption-scandal-has-bitterness-replacing-hope. 
Petrobras
costssocial
costs +
Petrobras
losses
+
legal
claims
+
+
Government
corruption
Nominations and
replacement of Petrobras
officers by Government
Procurement
corruption rigging
schemes
+
+
Contractor
"profit"
Proxy
"profit-share"
+
+
+
Industrial
and
logistics
burden
++
+
+
competiti
veness +
+
Corruption – Can Brazil win this war? –  Jorge Queiroz  –  2015                                  27  
countries is significantly impacted by political considerations. (Claessens, Feijen, & 
Laeven, 2008) show that Brazilian firms with campaign contributions to winning 
candidates experience higher returns and subsequently receive greater credit from banks. 
They estimate an economy-wide cost of capital misallocation that alone equals 0.2% of 
GDP per year – these contributions are limited to publicly listed firms that represent only 
14% of total corporate campaign contributions.34 The web of implications and financial 
considerations and related complexities is quite representative as shown by (Khwaja & 
Mian, 2011).  
Several cases illustrate the above. Among Brazil’s well-connected who obtained 
preferential credits from BNDES is the now bankrupt Group EBX owned by Eike 
Batista, son of former president and founder of Brazil’s largest mining company Vale, 
and JBS Friboi, the world’s largest meat processing company with outstanding loans of 
US$ 4 billion and US$ 3 billion respectively. A Congressional Special Committee has 
been created to investigate giant credits provided by the Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES) in Brazil and abroad.35 
Through trading in influence corruption also branches into the multi-trillion 
dollar war business that includes the United Nations (Miniter, 2011), and where 
architects of war and the true interests and corruption behind them are deleted from 
media accounts and replaced with stories about soldiers, weapons, and territory. 
(Nordstrom, 2004)    
4.5. Accountability Reinforcing Loop – R4  
Corruption and Accountability/Trust of Government, Congress and Judiciary 
In the process of development of their democratic institutions or any other 
political system societies build a natural threshold or scale related to their level of 
tolerance to wrongdoings of their governments and political representatives that are 
                                                
34 Mauro found the effect to be considerable: a one-standard-deviation (2.38-point) improvement in the 
corruption index is associated with over a 4-percentage-point increase in a country’s investment rate 
and over ½-percentage-point increase in the per capita growth rate. This means that if a given country 
were to improve its corruption grade from 6 out of 10 to 8 out of 10, its investment-GDP ratio would 
rise by almost 4 percentage points and its annual growth of GDP per capita would rise by almost half a 
percentage point.   
35 Bloomberg/Info Money Dec 15, 2014 and Globo G1 May 2015.  
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determined in accordance to their stage of institutional evolution. These illicit practices 
inflict a collateral damage upon institutions – it reduces public trust in government 
institutions (Chetwynd, Chetwynd, & Spector, 2003). Public revolt in turn can lead to 
political instability, considered to be one of the most important channel through which 
corruption affects economic development (Mo, 2001).  Less developed countries tend to 
have a long history of abuses perpetrated by the respective governing elite, nonetheless 
they also have a limit of tolerance.  This limit of tolerance also regulates the level of 
quality of institutions.   
 
                              Figure 12 – R4 – Corruption-Accountability Loop 
                     ___________ Positive Polarity   _ _ _ _ _ _ Negative Polarity 
The Brazilian society has recently demonstrated that its limit of tolerance has 
been reached and demands the ousting and punishment of corrupt representatives.  
Rousseff’s approval rate fell to a historic low level of 13% in March 201536.  
The Brazilian congress and judiciary also have very low approval rates. The astronomical 
corruption scandals that have been disclosed placed Brazil on a critical juncture to 
strengthen its institutions and should potentially lead to less corruption in the future, 
nonetheless. 
4.6. Public Sector Reinforcing Loop – R5  
Corruption and the Size of public sector causality  
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                                           Figure 13 – R5 – Public Sector Loop 
                    ___________ Positive Polarity   _ _ _ _ _ _ Negative Polarity 
The relationship between the size of the government and its inefficiency, 
including corruption, has been an important topic in economics. An increase in 
government size provides more opportunity for political rent-seeking, leading the 
politicians and bureaucrats to become more corrupt (Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1999) – 
bigger governments increase the expected payoff of illegal activities and, as a result, give 
an incentive for more illegal activities, such as corruption.   In the same direction, 
(Alesina & Angeletos, 2005) propose a theoretical model in which bigger governments 
increase the possibility for corruption.   (Goel & Nelson, 1998) illustrate that the size of 
the state and local governments in the United States has a strong positive influence on 
corruption.  In young democratic or transitional countries, an increase in government size 
can aggravate corruption, since monitoring on the government is weak. In contrast, when 
a democracy is sufficiently consolidated, larger government size leads to a reduction in 
corruption, because the monitoring mechanisms function well and can restrain corruption 
conducted by the politicians and bureaucrats.(Kotera, Keisuke, & Samreth, 2012)  
Brazil represents a good empirical case of these findings where the evolution of 
size of government more or less follows the increase in grand political corruption.  There 
is a recurrent anomaly in Brazilian politics since the end of the military regime in 1985 
and the start of the re-democratization period whereby it is common for elected 
presidents to negotiate concessions of ministries with their supporting parties in each 
presidential four-year term mandate.  At the end of the military transition regime in 1985, 
Brazil had 16 ministries; with the re-democratization, it increased to 30 from 1986-1993, 
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to 34 from 1994-2001, to 38 from 2002-2015.  This increase in number of ministries is 
associated with the increase in grand corruption since each of these ministries is 
responsible for a sizeable budget giving room to the enhancement of corruption.   
In order to increase their political influence, successive Brazilian governments 
extend their tentacles beyond the realms of public administration, to the management of 
state controlled companies, such as public banks, utilities, oil monopoly, and public 
pension funds.  Oil giant Petrobras, which is at the center of the latest multi-billion 
corruption scandal, is a good example of where the government distorted its role, and 
instead of restricting its action to controlling its interests as principal and controlling 
shareholder, it also makes political appointments of top executives who lack the 
necessary experience in the oil industry.  As such, the government assumes a dual role of 
supervisor and supervised, which is a major violation of the most basic management 
principle of segregation of functions and leaves the door wide open to corruption.     
4.7. Strong Institutions  
4.7.1. Governance indicators   
The research of the causes of corruption showed in quite a robust fashion that 
the most important variables that determine the level of corruption of any given country 
are those related to the quality of institutions/governance – the high quality and 
effectiveness of the institutions of the more developed countries are the key elements that 
safeguard their low levels of corruption. Conversely, high corruption countries are 
characterized by having lower quality institutions.  
Institutional quality/governance is probably the single most important variable 
that regulates the level of corruption in a country. In a seminal research working paper, 
(Kaufmann et al., 1999) provides empirical evidence of a strong causal relationship from 
better governance to better development outcomes such as higher per capita incomes (fig. 
14) and that quality of governance has significant explanatory power for the future 
economic outcomes. (Keefer & Knack, 2007) report that the ability of the poor countries 
to catch up to the developed world is determined in large part by the institutional 
environment in which the economic activity in these countries take place. 
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Institutional quality/governance is broadly defined as the traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This is separated in 3 areas 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010)37:  
A)  The process by which representatives of government, congress and judiciary are 
selected, monitored and replaced.  
B)  The capacity of government and congress to effectively formulate and implement 
sound policies. 
C)  The respect of society and the State for the institutions that govern economic and 
social interactions among them. Weak institutions are explored by self-serving, 
trading in influence groups which promote corruption and which again weakens 
institutions.  
The analysis carried out by (Kaufmann et al., 1999) is based on a database 
containing more than 300 governance indicators compiled from a variety of sources 
permitting cross-country comparisons of between 155 and 173 countries.   
Six aggregate indicators corresponding to the quality level of six basic 
governance concepts are constructed on a scale of a low -2.5 to 2.5 (Kaufmann et al., 
2014):  
Area A – the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced is 
composed of  
a1. Voice and accountability, which measures the extent to which citizens of a 
country are able to participate in the selection of governments including independence 
of media, and  
a2. Political instability and violence, measures perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional 
and/or violent means;  
Area B – the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound 
policies is composed of  
                                                
37 See Brazil Governance Indicators, Appendix 1. 
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b1. Government effectiveness, which combines perceptions of the quality of public 
service, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the 
independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to policies, and  
b2. Quality of regulatory burden, includes measures of the incidence of market-
unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as 
perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign 
trade and business development;  
Area C – the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic 
and social interactions among them  
c1. Rule of law, measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, effectiveness of the judiciary, and  
c2. Control of corruption.  
The choice of units for governance ensures that the estimates of governance 
have a mean of zero, a standard deviation of one, and range from around -2.5 to around 
2.5. These aggregate indicators are oriented in such a way that higher values correspond 
to better outcomes.   
(Kaufmann et al., 2014; Kaufmann et al., 1999) conclude with new empirical 
evidence that governance matters, in the sense that there is a strong causal relationship 
from good governance to better development outcomes such as higher per capita 
incomes, higher adult literacy (figs. 14 and 15) and lower infant mortality. 
Despite not yet published, it can be envisioned that WGI’s 2014 and 2015 
indices for institutional quality/governance in Brazil will probably reflect the increase in 
corruption that was inflicted upon the country in these two years.  
 Widespread corruption promoted by the government and its party (the Workers 
Party) for 12 years sparked a public outcry with over two million people demanding the 
ousting of the president throughout the streets of Brazil.  
Brazil’s continental size, large population and decentralized system of 
governance with 26 states and more than 5000 municipalities pose an additional problem 
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to Brazil. Brazil is one of the most decentralized countries in the world, with local 
municipal governments receiving about US$35 billion per year from the federal 
government to provide public services. The local government mayors and the local 
legislators are relatively free to decide how to spend these resources, allowing a great 
deal of room for corruption. The three most common ways in which local politicians can 
engage in corruption are fraud in the procurement in public services, diversion of funds, 
and over invoicing of public services. These findings suggest that electoral rules that 
enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician's corrupt 
behavior. (Ferraz & Finan, 2011)  
4.7.2. Rule of Law 
Empirical evidence shows that a high quality judiciary acts as a deterrent to 
corruption. Brazil’s high level of corruption generates a negative evaluation of the quality 
and effectiveness of its judiciary.  It also raises questions regarding the independence of 
the judiciary. 
It was found that the majority of people perceive their countries’ judiciary as 
corrupt including Brazilians (74%)38, Latin Americans (70-80%) and Americans (over 
50%).39  The success of any anticorruption policies passes mandatorily through having a 
highly moral and respected judiciary in whose magistrates the society deposits a great 
level of trust, a characteristic of countries with low level of corruption. 
Analysis of the level of corruption for Brazil in 2013 by specialized entities is 
directly associated with the quality of the judiciary. It shows a high corruption perception 
index of 83% and 75% by the Institute for Management and Development (IMD) and the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) respectively. (Kaufmann et al., 2014)     
The quality of a democracy requires a good system of checks and balances, 
which involves good governance, and good governance demands institutional 
accountability. Furthermore, one of the pillars of a democratic system is the separation 
                                                
38 Datafolha  
39 (TransparencyInternational, 2007) 
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and independence of institutions – government, congress and the judiciary, and research 
has shown that judicial independence directly affects economic growth (Feld, 2003).	  	    
The judiciary as guardian of the rule of law has a key role in the fight against 
corruption and its quality is directly related to the level of corruption in any country.  
Research of (Lambsdorff, 2007) shows there is a strong correlation between corruption 
and the quality of the judicial system.  
Higher courts are the Achilles-heel of the rule of law in Brazil in what concerns 
the fight against corruption. The lenient positions taken by the Brazilian Supreme Court 
in the decisions involving the “soft” sentencing and handling of the political 
representatives involved in the recent grand corruption scandals such as the mensalao40 
and the pertrolao/lavajato41 have been causing great controversy and popular discontent, 
which are aggravated by various episodes, including: (i) the fact that judge Toffoli, one 
of the Supreme Court judges nominated by former president Lula, had been legal council 
of the former president’s party (Workers Party), attorney on his presidential campaigns of 
1998, 2002 and 2006, and other polemic issues; (ii) by the controversial nomination of 
judge Fachin to the Supreme Court by President Rousseff in May 2015 in the midst of an 
unprecedented institutional crisis, like judge Toffoli, seen as being too close and biased 
towards the Workers Party; and (iii) by the release of eight suspects involved in  the 
Petrobras corruption scheme who had been incarcerated by a federal judge following 
investigations by the federal prosecutors and federal police. It is not uncommon to see 
magistrates in Brazil involved in corruption schemes and retired magistrates lobbying in 
in the judiciary favor of their clients.  Independence implies that judges’ careers do not 
depend on pleasing those with political and economic power.(Rose-Ackerman, 2007) 
                                                
40 Mensalao means monthly payment – a major former president Lula’s government led corruption 
scheme to bribe congress representatives to approve its proposals. 
41 Ibid. 10 and 11 
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Figure 14 - Six Governance Indicators vs. Per Capita Incomes. Horizontal axis: 
Quality of Governance index aggregates from worst level of quality -2.5 to best 
level of quality 2.5; higher values mean better outcome. Vertical axis: 
Logarithm of per capita GDP at PPP x 1000. Results show that the better the 
quality of governance indicator, the higher the per capita income. Note that in 
the cases of Political Instability, Regulatory Burden and Corruption, the higher 
quality of governance means less.  (Kaufmann et al., 1999) 
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Figure 15 - Six Governance Indicators vs. Adult Literacy Rate. Horizontal axis: 
Quality of Governance index aggregates from low -2.5 to high 2.5; higher 
values mean better outcome. Vertical axis: Adult literacy rate in percent. 
Results show that the higher the Quality of Governance Indicator the higher the 
Adult Literacy Rate. Note that in the cases of Political Instability, Regulatory 
Burden and Corruption, the higher quality of governance means less. 
(Kaufmann et al., 1999) 
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In fact, there is a major flaw in the Brazilian penal code that gives room to 
corruption and impunity of the grand corrupt and fraudsters.  The penal code stipulates a 
time limit throughout the criminal procedure for the prosecutor and defendant with the 
exception of higher court judges who act in a discretionary manner. A typical example is 
where a federal judge sentences corruption suspects to jail, and the appeals or supreme 
court readily releases them, and puts the case in a “drawer/freezer” for several years 
while the suspects are free, a rather common practice in high profile cases involving large 
sums of money.  Other times the sentenced white-collar criminal serves most of the 
sentence at home.  As a result justice is never delivered.  
A competent, independent, and incorruptible judiciary is a basic pillar of a 
democratic and just nation – corruption in the judiciary undermines the dictates 
prescribed by the rule of law consequently perpetuating impunity, and favoring those 
parties in interest and self-serving magistrates to the detriment of the whole society. 
4.7.3. Strong institutions dominating balancing loop – B1 group of loops 
 
                             Figure 16 – Strong Institutions balancing variables 
                       ___________ Positive Polarity   _ _ _ _ _ _ Negative Polarity 
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Two key variables/sequence of variables converge at the level of quality of 
institutions variable as shown in figure 16.  One is level of corruption, which triggers a 
set of reinforcing loops R1.1 to R1.6 (discussed in section 4.2), and the other is the 
sequence starting with the accountability of government, congress and judiciary, which 
triggers a group of strong institutions balancing loops B1.1 to B1.6 discussed herein. As 
seen, starting at the level of quality of institutions, these two groups of loops share the 
same variables and the behavior will be dictated by the characteristics of the destructive 
variable (level of corruption) and by those of a set of virtuous variables (starting with 
institutional accountability).  
The strong institutions feedback loops (B1 group of balancing loops – B1.1 to 
B1.6) have a powerful balancing dominating force that well structured, and meeting the 
most fundamental prerequisites and policies, has the strength to override the destructive 
power of corruption (Fig. 17). When it comes to grand political corruption the balancing 
power of institutions initiates in these variables: level of accountability in government, 
congress, and the judiciary; social discontent; punishment/ousting of the corrupt, and 
better election process (non-corrupt).   
The process in Brazil works as follows: it originates with corruption’s powerful 
and fast driving forces and variables (R1 group of loops) overpowering the balancing 
forces that retain corruption, which leads to a gradual lowering of accountability and loss 
of trust in government, and/or in congress, and/or in the judiciary until the accumulation 
of corruption activities reach the society’s limit of tolerance to corruption, which will 
generate a balancing domino effect by triggering higher social discontent and mass 
demonstrations, demanding the ousting and conviction/punishment of the corrupt 
politicians and officials as observed in Brazil in the mass movements of March 2015. 
This in turn results in increased social awareness and, potentially, election of non-corrupt 
politicians – in an effort to reduce the “stock” of corrupt political representatives in 
government, congress and judiciary; a democratic process that is expected to result in 
stronger institutions/governance.  
Loop B1.1 – Quality of Institutions-Trading in influence  
The strong institutions loops (B1.1 to B1.6) act to reduce the force of the 
variables that cause corruption including trading in influence vehicles such as lobbying, 
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campaign contributions, rent-seeking and high profile corruption schemes hidden in 
contracts with the various areas and levels of government, agencies, state controlled 
companies, banks, pension funds, and insurance companies. 
The remaining five key variables are the same as those that exert a pressure to 
cause the increase of corruption and discussed in section 4.2 with the difference that they 
are subject the counterbalancing forces coming from the virtuous constructive variables:  
 
 
                     Figure 17 - B1 – Strong Institutions dominating balancing loop 
                       ___________ Positive Polarity   _ _ _ _ _ _ Negative Polarity 
Loop B1.2 – Quality of Institutions-Informal and underground economy  
The good quality institutions exercise a balancing force over the informal and 
underground economy – it is discussed in section 4.1 and in more detail in section 4.9. 
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Good democratic institutions have solid “checks and balances” and rule of law 
to avoid the installation of populist governments as discussed in section 4.3 – and also 
covered in section 4.2. 
Loop B1.4 – Quality of Institutions-Number of taxes and rates  
Corruption also fosters the increase in the number of taxes and rates in an effort 
to cover for the deficits generated by corruption and poor administration of public 
finances. Excessive number of taxes and rates also causes an increase in the informal 
economy with several consequences, among them a high tax evasion of 13% of Brazil’s 
GDP.42 Good quality institutions exert the counterbalancing force to avoid and reduce 
excesses. It is discussed in section 4.2 and in more detail in section 4.9 
Loop B1.5 – Quality of Institutions-Size of the public sector 
As seen in section 4.6, the start of the re-democratization period in 1986 marked 
the use of bigger government with ministries used as a bargaining tool in exchange of 
political support – a characteristic of young democracies.   
Loop B1.6 – Quality of Institutions-Regulatory efficiency  
 Researchers observe a positive association between corruption and excessive 
government regulation with the implications covered in section 4.2. (Ades & Di Tella, 
1997, 1999; Djankov et al., 2002; Goel & Nelson, 2005; Svensson, 2005; Treisman, 
2000). Good quality institutions are what minimize excess red-tape. 
4.8. Public, Private Investments and Human Capital balancing [Growth related] 
loops – B2, B3 and B4 
Loops B2, B3, and B4 are growth related loops. (Li et al., 2000) found that 
even after correcting for measurement errors, corruption still retards economic growth.   
(Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997) report that political corruption is driven by weak 
governance, and show that higher corruption is associated with: (i) higher public 
investment; (ii) lower government revenues; (iii) lower expenditures on operations and 
                                                
42 Valor Economico November 9, 2013.  http://www.valor.com.br/brasil/3333552/no-mundo-brasil-so-
perde-para-russia-em-sonegacao-fiscal-diz-estudo. 
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management; (iv) lower quality of public infrastructure; and (v) lower productivity of 
public investment – five channels through which corruption lowers growth.  
 
 
                                                  Figure 18 – B2, B3 and B4  
                     Public, Private Investments and Human Capital balancing loops 
                       ___________ Positive Polarity   _ _ _ _ _ _ Negative Polarity 
Analyses of existing data on GDP and corruption (Transparency International, 
Worldwide Governance Index (Kaufmann et al., 2014) and others) demonstrate that there 
is a much higher incidence of corruption in poor and developing countries than in 
developed countries – the less developed the country, the higher the level of corruption.  
In fact, the relationship between corruption and development is the most extensively 
researched aspect in the empirical literature on corruption.  (Lambsdorff, 2007) 
reinforces several scientific findings and confirms that corruption reduces productivity of 
capital (fig. 19).  
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                 Figure 19 - Corruption and Productivity of Capital (Lambsdorff, 2007) 
Loop B2 – Private investments [and Growth]  
In his pioneering study (Mauro, 1995) followed by (Mauro, 1997) found that 
corruption lowers private investment, thereby reducing economic growth.  Many other 
studies including (Tanzi & Davoodi, 2000) report a similar effect.  Further, (Mo, 2001) 
noted that corruption reduces the level of human capital and the share of private 
investment. It also generates uncertainty which increases the risk premium of investment 
decisions (Gupta et al., 1998). (Lambsdorff, 2007) further analyzed the impact of 
corruption on total net capital (fig.20) – in a cross section of 64 countries, corruption is 
shown to decrease capital inflows at a high confidence level, controlling for various 
explanatory variables such as GDP per head, domestic savings rates, and raw material 
exports.  
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                    Figure 20 – Corruption and Net Capital Inflows (Lambsdorff, 2007) 
Loop B3 – Public investments [and Growth]   
An extensive study by (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997) provides evidence of the 
many channels through which corruption corrodes public investment and reduces growth. 
Corruption distorts the entire decision-making process related to public investments. 
Corruption reduces growth by reducing the quality of the existing infrastructure. A 
deteriorating infrastructure increases the cost of doing business for both the public and 
private sector, for instance: congestions, delays, accidents, floods, power outages, etc., 
thus leading to lower output and growth. Corruption also reduces growth by lowering 
government revenue needed to finance productive spending.  
Loop B4 – Human Capital [and Growth]  
Research also demonstrates that corruption reduces average income and 
education, while better education generates growth and a more informed electorate, that, 
in turn, produces greater effectiveness in political participation and better monitoring of 
actions of representatives of government, congress and judiciary, identifying and 
punishing corrupt behavior (more so with grand political corruption). Better education 
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may put sufficient pressure on governments to pass institutional reforms aimed at 
dramatically reducing future corruption.    
Higher corruption is associated with lower quality and spending in education 
and health (Mauro, 1997; Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997). A higher education endowment will 
reduce inequality (Tinbergen, 1975). Tests carried out by (Gupta et al., 1998) also show 
that a worsening in the corruption level by one standard deviation (2.52 on a scale of 0 to 
10) is associated with the same increase in the Gini coefficient as a reduction in average 
secondary schooling of 2.3 years.   
Corruption negatively affects education levels since it reduces disposable 
incomes and the ability to invest in education just as education affects corruption through 
a host of variables. Countries with intermediate levels of education are most likely to 
remain in a poverty trap since the intermediate levels of education allow for some basic 
initiatives against corruption but not good enough monitoring, a fact that is detrimental to 
poverty reduction. Low education levels in Brazil are significantly affected by poor 
quality of education and high dropout rates, which in turn determine the quality of 
institutions (Eicher et al., 2009; Gupta et al., 1998; Treisman, 2000). 
4.9. Corruption, informal economy, currency black market and tax revenue 
Loops R6.1 to R6.6 – Informal economy 
Research has shown that corruption is related to the unofficial or underground 
economy via the following six main reinforcing loops: (i) informal economy – loop R6.1; 
(ii) private investment-informal economy – loop R6.2; (iii) public investments-informal 
economy – loop R6.3, (iv) public expenditures-informal economy – loop R6.4, (v) 
number of taxes and rates-informal economy – loop R6.5, and (vi) regulatory efficiency-
informal economy – loop R6.6.  Most variables have been individually discussed in other 
sections and are now analyzed in their interrelations with tax revenues and the informal 
economy.    
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                                       Figure 21 – Informal Economy / Tax Loops 
                       ___________ Positive Polarity   _ _ _ _ _ _ Negative Polarity 
Informality has a direct causality with tax revenue and with the currency black 
market.  (Friedman et al., 2000) and (Johnson et al., 1999) demonstrated that countries 
with a larger unofficial or underground economy tend to have higher levels of corruption 
as shown in figure 22. Technical papers written by (Dreher et al., 2007), (Dreher & 
Schneider, 2006) and (Hibbs & Piculescu, 2005) corroborate with these findings. 
The unofficial or underground economy, the so called informality, happens 
everywhere and consists of all economic activities that would generally be taxable were 
they reported – it is characterized by unreported income from the production of goods 
and services, either from monetary or barter transactions. It is an economic phenomenon 
that in its higher levels that characterize low income countries is a complement to 
corruption, such as seen in Brazil where the informal economy corresponds to 40% of 
GDP (Arvate et al., 2004). In high income countries informal economy activities and 
corruption are substitutes. (Dreher & Schneider, 2006) 
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         Figure 22 – Corruption vs. Unofficial Economy 	  	   
Informality is strongly associated with corruption, poverty, inequality, tax 
evasion, and illicit transactions. It comprises illegal practices such as hiring workers 
without registration, atypical work contracts, false labor cooperatives, house workers, 
street commerce, and autonomous workers without social security registration as defined 
by the World Labor Organization. Furthermore the underground economy includes all 
sorts of illegal and criminal activities such as organized crime and narcotrafficking. 
Activities carried out in the informal economy are generally concealed from 
public authorities to avoid: 
- paying income tax, value added and other taxes, as well as payment of social 
security contributions, many times as a matter of survival since tax burden can 
make certain activities unviable, 
- having to meet certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum wages, 
maximum working hours, safety standards, etc., and 
- complying with cumbersome regulations and bureaucratic procedures. 
A World Bank study (Johnson et al., 1999) found that the unofficial economy 
accounts for a larger share of GDP where there is great bureaucratic inefficiency and 
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discretion, and where firms experience a greater tax and regulatory burden, as well as 
more bribery and corruption. Furthermore, the unofficial economy was found to be much 
larger where there is less state revenue and where the rule of law is weak. The study also 
found that countries with a larger unofficial economy tend to grow more slowly.  
The vast majority of workers in the underground economy are less privileged, 
less educated, less qualified and poor who do not manage to participate in the formal 
economy. They are many times subjected to discrimination and perform work that is 
degrading. They are also characterized by low pay and are totally excluded from the 
employment-related benefits provided by the Brazilian law, such as unemployment 
benefits, one additional month’s salary every year, children’s benefits, maternity leave, 
dismissal and vacation related benefits, social security and retirement, access to credit 
and many more. About one-half of the Brazilian labor force is in the 
unofficial/underground economy, affecting more than 100 million people who struggle to 
survive in a shadow economy and experience a high level of insecurity, in addition to not 
being reached by social justice; a dual society of the haves and have-nots, the included 
and the excluded. 
	  	  
Figure 23 (official data - source Ipea Brazil) 
(Friedman et al., 2000), (Johnson et al., 1999) and (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997) 
found the unofficial economy to negatively impact government revenues as shown in 
figure 24.  
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       Figure 24 – Government Revenue (%GDP) vs. Unofficial Economy (%GDP)  
(Tanzi & Davoodi, 2000) concluded that a 1 point increase in corruption is 
associated with a 1.5 percentage point decline in total revenue relative to GDP and a 2.7 
percentage point decline in the ratio of taxes to GDP. Corruption was found to generate a 
higher impact on direct taxes than on indirect taxes, indicating that countries with higher 
corruption rely more on indirect taxes than on direct taxes. Tax evasion in Brazil reaches 
13% of GDP.43  
An interesting analysis of a unique dataset on corruption and informal sector 
employment in 476 Brazilian municipalities (Bologna, 2014) to estimate whether 
corruption impacts GDP or income levels once variation in informal economic activity is 
taken into account and found that higher levels of corruption and a larger informal 
economy are generally associated with poor economic outcomes. However, only the size 
of the informal economy (not corruption) showed a robust and statistically significant 
effect. It concluded that (i) one standard deviation increase (0.186) in the share of total 
workers in the underground economy explains a decrease in GDP per-capita of about 18 
                                                
43 Valor Economico November 9, 2013.  http://www.valor.com.br/brasil/3333552/no-mundo-brasil-so-
perde-para-russia-em-sonegacao-fiscal-diz-estudo. 
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percent and (b) a one standard deviation increase in the size of the informal sector is 
associated with a decrease in income (both formal and informal) per-worker of about 8 
percent. Considering that the size of the informal economy varies from 13 to 98 percent 
across municipalities in Brazil, these effects can be extremely large. Thus, the results 
indicate that the size of the informal economy in Brazil’s municipalities may be more 
important for economic outcomes than corruption.  
Over and above what has been described herein, there is a circulation of 
billions through the domestic financial and foreign exchange black market.  
Loop R7 – Black Market 
Corruption, informality, tax evasion and domestic and offshore illicit financial 
transactions are overwhelming and intimately related. (Johnson et al., 1999) There is 
extensive literature on the different types of grand corrupt/criminal/illegal schemes 
adopted by all types of individuals and organizations including corporations and banks 
both locally and through cross-border transactions internationally. Illicit transfers 
represent 2.5% of Brazil’s GDP annually (Kar, 2014) and tax evasion reaches over 13% 
of GDP every year.44 
It is estimated that US$20 trillion dollars are deposited in financial heavens 
(McNair et al., 2014; Sood, 2014) – more than the United States GDP and almost 30% of 
the world’s total GDP. Illicit financial outflows from the developing countries reached 
US$1 trillion dollars in 2011 – it increased by an average of more than 10 percent per 
year over the decade and continues to grow (Kar & LeBlanc, 2013).  
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           Figure 25 – Illicit Outflows – 10-year period – 2003-2012 
 
                                                
44 Ibid. 43. 
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Major international anti-corruption efforts are promoted by Transparency 
International, Global Financial Integrity, OECD, among others, in a fight that will take 
many years to produce more representative results. There are two major caveats that 
stand in the way of the solutions. The first is that grand corruption and illicit activities 
involve powerful people who are beneficiaries of these schemes, the same ones it is 
relied upon to enforce strong sanctions to curtail corruption, as seen in Brazil. The 
second is that countries where these moneys are deposited and/or assets are held, such as 
valuable properties and real estate, are not willing to change the status quo. The examples 
include Switzerland, Luxembourg, U.S., UK/London, and France/Paris.    
4.10. Discussion 
One important finding of the present thesis is the identification of fast and slow 
overlapping loops, and can be seen quite clearly in the analysis herein. The fast loops are 
ones of a destructive nature and directly contaminate the quality of institutions, spreading 
throughout other important variables such as trading in influence, size of the public 
sector, regulatory efficiency, and number of taxes and rates with devastating 
consequences in Brazil. The forces that counterbalance the corruption enhancement ones 
are of a long and slow nature, making the reduction of corruption a more difficult task. 
Because of this phenomenon, corruption in Brazil increased significantly since 
2002, reaching a high level of political instability, despite the fact that the level of 
education has been consistently increasing throughout the re-democratization period that 
started in 1986. This shows that education alone will not solve the grave and 
longstanding problem of corruption in Brazil.  
Taking into account all correlations and cross-reference analysis in light of 
behavior curves of corruption perception shown in figure 1, and adding Chile and Italy, 
we arrive at a few important considerations that led to the behavior demonstrated in 
figure 26 and need to be observed in future research:  
i. China has one of the highest levels of corruption among all countries despite having 
the fastest growing economy and scoring the highest on Pisa test which makes it a 
point out of the curve in what concerns the findings on the correlations between 
development and education, and corruption;  
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ii. Italy is one of the most developed and educated countries in the world and birth to 
strong institutions but has a persistent high level of corruption which has been 
increasing since year 2000, also making it a point out of the curve;  
 
 
Figure 26 
iii. Chile has shown that corruption can be controlled if a country has strong institutions 
and determination despite being in a region conceived by many to be corrupt by 
nature45;  
iv. The greatest corruptors are among the world’s richest countries that extract wealth 
from corrupt-prone less developed corruptee-countries, a phenomenon that also 
happens in Brazil46;  
v. The more developed nations have lower corruption domestically due to their stronger 
institutions but promote corruption in countries that have weaker institutions 
nonetheless47;  
                                                
45 Costa Rica is another good example in Latin America. 
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vi. Brazil has been victim to the largest corruption scheme in its history, orchestrated 
from 2002 to 2015 by populist political leaders, and involving amounts without 
parallel to secure their power project of permanent domination and it appears that 
WGI’s corruption perception index did not capture such unprecedented phenomenon;  
vii. Brazil is a continent-size country with 26 states, over 5000 municipalities all 
equipped with respective executive, legislative and judiciary, and this gives room to 
corrupt practices – Brazil is seen as having one of the best de jure judicial systems in 
existence but also one of the worst de facto judicial systems;  
viii. Geographic dimension, population and inequality are common characteristics of high 
corruption countries, with China, Russia, Mexico and India being the first, second, 
third and fifth countries with the highest volume of illicit transfers of money with 
Brazil being the seventh after Saudi Arabia.  
Empirical evidence shows that corruption is a global pandemic with 
destructive proportions that societies and most academics still do not realize, and that all 
the efforts that are being undertaken are still small in relation to its astronomic 
proportions. The findings and conceptual framework of the thesis represent, to the best of 
my knowledge, a new contribution to the academic world.   
                                                                                                                                           
47 Ibid. 46. 
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5. Policy Recommendations  
Brazil has extensive legislation covering corruption related activities and has 
recently passed a new anticorruption law on August 2013. It is signatory of the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), the Inter-American Convention 
against Corruption, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). These can be seen as 
some of the reasons why corruption in Brazil is not larger.  
The UNCAC entered into effect in 2005 having been signed by 172 countries 
including Brazil and is the most recent of a long series of developments in which experts 
and politicians have recognized the far-reaching impact of corruption, an economic crime 
that undermines the value of democracy, sustainable development, and rule of law.  The 
UNCAC deals with forms of corruption that had not been covered by many of the earlier 
international instruments, such as trading in influence, abuse of function, recovery of 
stolen assets and various types of corruption in the private sector. The anti-corruption 
programs employed to date have been highly important and on the right direction but 
have had little impact thus far.  
Policy design and implementation of institutional reforms consisting of twenty 
key directives is recommended and seen as the most effective to weaken the corruption 
related reinforcing loops and strengthen the institutional oversight/governance related 
balancing loops in Brazil. Each of these policy recommendations demand time to be 
detailed and well implemented by different committees in congress in an open and 
transparent fashion – they are distributed among different committees in congress 
consisting of: criminal procedure, constitution and justice, political reform, regulatory, 
administrative reform, finance, tax and customs.   
Committee: Criminal Procedure – Loop B1.1  
(i) One of the gravest and pressing corruption related problem in Brazil has a name – 
impunity.  Despite all the negative media corruption scandals receive, there is no 
punishment. It is not a case that demands a new policy or law but rather that the judiciary 
dully fulfills its duty in observation to the existing laws and in accordance with the spirit 
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of the laws – it must execute the existing laws. It is also vital to give maximum visibility 
to the all the corrupt, including accomplices and collaborators, as well as those who 
enforce the law, the good-doers, and those who look away, procrastinate, and don’t 
deliver justice, such as members of the judiciary, congress and government. Without 
punishment, the grand corrupt cannot be deterred and a message is sent to society that 
corruption is a rewarding criminal offence. This is the starting point in the fight against 
corruption and has a shorter time delay to produce results.   
(ii) Improve the criminal procedure code to ensure the implementation of a speedy 
criminal procedure for white collar-criminals and incarceration as of the judicial 
indictment. As it stands today, the criminal procedure is too lenient on the grand corrupt 
and fraudsters – totally disproportionate with the damage they cause. Today’s criminal 
procedure code provides that defendants of white-collar crimes who exploited their 
position of privilege and power can avoid being incarcerated until all appellate rights are 
exhausted.  In other words, a white-collar criminal defendant remains free from jail so 
long as an appeal of his or her sentence remains pending.  In fact, there is many ways that 
white-collar criminal appeals can remain pending “forever”, which materially aids in 
incentivizing corruption and fraud in Brazil because these criminals know that they can 
use this legal loophole as a way to avoid serving one day of jail time.   
(iii) Develop and implement widespread and strong policies to strengthen Brazil’s anti-
corruption institutions, together with more severe and effective legal sanctions, including 
but not limited to much longer prison terms, to significantly increase the risks and costs 
of corruption to both corruptors and corruptees, in addition to different ways to stimulate 
whistleblowing.  
Committee: Constitution and Justice – Loop B1.1  
(iv) Create a special committee to revise and strengthen the procedure for the nomination 
of Supreme Court judges in order to eliminate the political influence upon them, and 
guarantee their absolute independence. Strengthen the governance over the judiciary. 
There are many flaws that surround the judiciary and demand a detailed analysis and 
reform. 
(v) End the prevailing political immunity system.  
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Committee: Regulatory – Loop R1.6 / B1.6 
(vi) Introduce a nationwide dissemination campaign of the large sums involved in 
corruption and the immense physical and mental harm corruptors and fraudsters inflict on 
the wellbeing of Society as a whole, more so on the enhancement of poverty and 
inequality, usurping the rights and lives of millions of hungry children, women, men and 
elderly, in order to achieve higher levels of transparency and engagement of the civil 
society.  
(vii) Introduce the study of corruption at all levels of the school curricula. 
(viii) Strengthen the regulations and transparency related to procurement by federal, state 
and municipal governments and state controlled companies. 
(ix) Strengthen the regulations related to government financing of projects in other 
countries together imposing greater transparency on all government financing.   
Committee: Political Reform – Loop B1.1  
(x) Change the election system at the federal, state and municipal levels in order 
eliminate the possibility of reelection of executive offices such as president, governors 
and mayors, which will promote the alternation of power and help reduce corruption. 
Election process in Brazil was interrupted as a result of an institutional crisis/national 
security motivated by a communist threat with the establishment of a military transition 
regime that lasted from 1964 to 1986.  
(xi) Introduce a political reform in order to improve the electoral process of congress 
representatives extensive to states and municipalities as well as the quality of those 
running for office. Reduce the number of political parties, many of which are used as a 
“rental” party and also drain resources from the electoral funding program. Introduce the 
district voting system. 
(xii) Introduce a recall system similar to the one existing in the U.S. whereby voters can 
remove an elected official from office through a direct vote before his or her term has 
ended. 
Corruption – Can Brazil win this war? –  Jorge Queiroz  –  2015                                  56  
(xiii) Impose severe restrictions of governmental use of public money for electoral and 
propaganda purposes. 
Committee: Administrative – Loop R1.5 / B1.5 
(xiv) Impose a limit to the size of governments at all levels.  Perform a complete 
reorganization overhaul of all levels of government including allowances for expenses. 
Curtail the overwhelming abuses committed with the public money.   
(xv) Forbid all politicians of occupying any office in state controlled companies. Impose 
a policy that determines that all state controlled companies are professionalized. 
(xvi) Forbid the widespread practice of nepotism in government, congress and the 
judiciary. 
Committee: Tax and Customs – Loop 7 
(xvii) Impose strict controls and sanctions over mispricing in trade. 
(xviii) Increase controls on customs, borders, narcotrafficking, and organized crime. 
Committee: Finance – Loop R7 
(xix) Impose stringent controls and sanctions over the giant parallel/black market for 
both Brazilian currency ($ Real) and foreign exchange. This is one of the key avenues 
whereby money from corruption flows.  
(xx) Strengthen the efforts along the international community to demand transparency 
from banks that hide stolen money, and to demand an end to anonymous corporations in 
tax heavens. Enhance policies to include reverse tracing procedure whereby it demands 
the proof of origination of the money being spent by suspects. Strengthen the cooperation 
with law enforcement agents of other jurisdictions. 
This set of policies combined with the current initiatives in progress both 
nationally and internationally will exert the required downward force to potentially 
reduce corruption in Brazil in the long run. Our research indicates that this is a slow 
process due to the high resilience of corruption in Brazil and to its enduring and systemic 
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nature.  The unprecedented institutional critical juncture Brazil is now undergoing has 
the ingredients to make the level of corruption go down, initially to a pre-2002 level in 
about 20 years and further down in a 50 years time. It is no easy task since corruption is 
so deep-rooted in Brazil’s institutions. Once more information on corruption related 
variables are available, computer modeling of projections and simulations should be 
pursued in future research.  
Brazil is at a crossroad – it suffered a retrogression in the process of firming 
itself as a true and corrupt-free democracy, and in the breaking away from its cultural 
vocation to totalitarianism. A deterioration process started in 2002 imposed by a populist 
government, together with a very consenting congress where several representatives have 
been involved in government corruption scandals, and a lenient judiciary.  
Brazil has to make a decision – whether it wants to drastically reduce 
corruption permanently or continue to be tolerant with political white-collar crimes.  The 
policies recommended herein will only work if Brazil says no to corruption, no to any 
form of totalitarianism, yes to the separation of powers, yes to the rule of law, and yes to 
the universal human right of its people to a dignifying life.  
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6. Conclusion 
The thesis analyzed herein builds a strong foundation and content regarding 
the highly complex dynamics of corruption in Brazil providing a better picture and 
understanding of how corruption works. It details and analyzes its causes and 
consequences, and lays the ground for the development of computer modeling of 
projections and simulations. In addition, it discloses the fast destructive forces of the 
reinforcing loops and the virtual forces of the slow balancing loops and their relevance in 
the dynamics of increase and decrease in corruption.  
The thesis addresses the research question of “how corruption affects the well-
being in Brazil” weakening the quality of institutions, causing inequality and poverty, 
and reducing investment and growth.  It also demonstrates that the implementation of the 
recommended anti-corruption policies in Brazil such as (i) stronger enforcement of 
current criminal laws to stop prevailing impunity among corrupt criminals, (ii) 
improvement of the electoral system, (iii) strengthening of the judiciary, (iv) political and 
administrative reform, (v) financial, tax and customs reform, among others, should result 
in an improvement of several variables such as governance, education and income 
together with a greater well-being via a lower inequality/Gini index. 
The introduction of a better and more effective electoral system together with 
greater transparency will result in alternation of power followed by better preventative 
controls, better independent governance, stricter and more effective sanctions, ousting of 
the corrupt representatives and officials, non-inflated government, lower regulatory 
burden, greater public awareness and involvement, public exposure of corrupt officials, 
significantly higher risks to corrupt officials, lower potential gains to corrupt officials, 
better judiciary, and ultimately in lower levels of grand corruption and in the winning of 
the long war against corruption. 	  
Having achieved the objectives laid out for the thesis, I hope it can give good 
contributions to the academic world, policy makers, anti-corruption fighters, NGOs, 
donor agencies and supra-national organizations by taking the understanding of 
corruption in Brazil as well as solutions to a new level, which should also aid in the 
further research in the area in an array of different disciplines and initiatives such as: (i) 
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computer modeling of projections and simulations converting the causal diagrams of the 
present thesis in stock and flow diagrams; (ii) detail each of the policy recommendations 
of the present thesis; (iii) enhance anti-corruption programs along NGOs, donor agencies 
and supra-national organizations; (iv) development of a diversity of anti-corruption 
training programs; (v) further explore the impacts of corruption on poverty and 
inequality; (vi) enhance the curricula of different disciplines in higher level education: 
law, finance, economics, public administration, political science, social sciences, and 
others.   
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Appendix I – Brazil Governance Indicators48 
Corruption exists because there are not enough monitoring and incentives to eliminate it (A. 
Banerjee et al., 2012). Governance indicators corroborate with the fact that corruption in 
Brazil is endemic remaining consistently high independent of the economic cycle it is in. 
Governance is defined as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised. This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound 
policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic 
and social interactions among them.” (Kaufmann et al., 2014) There are two measures of 
governance corresponding to each of these three areas, resulting in a total of six dimensions 
of governance. Corruption has to do with the fragility of these six interrelated dimensions of 
governance. 
(a) The process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced: 
• Voice and Accountability – perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are 
able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media. 
• Political Stability and Absence of Violence – perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically‐motivated violence and terrorism. 
(b) The capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound 
policies: 
• Government Effectiveness – perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality 
of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. 
• Regulatory Quality – perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
(c) The respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and 
social interactions among them: 
                                                
48 (Kaufmann et al., 2010) (Kaufmann et al., 2014) 
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• Rule of Law – perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. 
• Control of Corruption – perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
"capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
 
 
Figure 27 – Worldwide Governance Indicators49 (Kaufmann et al., 2014) 
 
 
 
 
                                                
49 Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2013, Country Data Report for Brazil, 1996-2013. WGI are a research dataset 
summarizing the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert 
survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, 
think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms. The WGI do not 
reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.  
Percentile rank among all 215 countries ranges from 0 (lowest control of corruption) to100 (highest control of 
corruption) rank. A key feature of the WGI is that all country scores are accompanied by standard errors.  These 
standard errors reflect the number of sources available for a country and the extent to which these sources agree with 
each other (with more sources and more agreement leading to smaller standard errors). In our graphical presentation of 
the data we transform these standard errors into 90 percent confidence intervals or "margins of error". 
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Figure 28 – Control of Corruption Brazil 1996-2013 (Kaufmann et al., 2014) 	  
	  
1996	   1998	   2000	   2002	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   2005	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   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	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   2013	  
BTI	  
	   	   	   	  
	  0.60	  	   	  0.60	  	   	  0.65	  	   	  0.65	  	   	  0.75	  	   	  0.75	  	   	  0.70	  	   	  0.70	  	   	  0.70	  	   	  0.70	  	   	  0.70	  	  
CCR	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  0.52	  	   	  0.53	  	   	  0.53	  	   	  0.53	  	   	  0.53	  	  
EIU	   	  0.25	  	   	  0.25	  	   	  0.25	  	   	  0.25	  	   	  0.25	  	   	  0.25	  	   	  0.25	  	   	  0.25	  	   	  0.25	  	   	  0.25	  	   	  0.25	  	   	  0.25	  	   	  0.25	  	   	  0.25	  	   	  0.25	  	  
TI	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  0.56	  	   	  0.56	  	   	  0.56	  	  
	   	   	  
	  0.68	  	   	  0.68	  	   	  0.68	  	   	  0.68	  	  
WEF	   	  0.46	  	   	  0.52	  	   	  0.49	  	   	  0.52	  	   	  0.48	  	   	  0.56	  	   	  0.46	  	   	  0.49	  	   	  0.36	  	   	  0.41	  	   	  0.36	  	   	  0.44	  	   	  0.42	  	   	  0.42	  	   	  0.37	  	  
GII	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  0.68	  	   	  0.68	  	   	  0.68	  	   	  0.65	  	   	  0.65	  	   	  0.65	  	  
	   	  Gallup	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  0.28	  	   	  0.34	  	   	  0.32	  	   	  0.31	  	   	  0.40	  	   	  0.40	  	   	  0.37	  	   	  0.31	  	  
IFD	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  0.59	  	   	  0.59	  	   	  0.59	  	   	  0.58	  	   	  0.60	  	   	  0.70	  	   	  0.70	  	   	  0.73	  	   	  0.73	  	   	  0.73	  	  
IPD	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  0.50	  	   	  0.50	  	   	  0.50	  	   	  0.44	  	   	  0.44	  	   	  0.44	  	   	  0.17	  	   	  0.17	  	  
LBO	  
	   	  
	  0.30	  	   	  0.38	  	   	  0.44	  	   	  0.46	  	   	  0.26	  	   	  0.31	  	   	  0.34	  	   	  0.47	  	   	  0.66	  	   	  0.73	  	   	  0.68	  	   	  0.68	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PRS	   	  0.50	  	   	  0.50	  	   	  0.50	  	   	  0.67	  	   	  0.67	  	   	  0.33	  	   	  0.25	  	   	  0.33	  	   	  0.33	  	   	  0.50	  	   	  0.50	  	   	  0.50	  	   	  0.50	  	   	  0.42	  	   	  0.42	  	  
VAB	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  0.26	  	   	  0.26	  	   	  0.30	  	   	  0.30	  	   	  0.33	  	   	  0.33	  	   	  0.26	  	   	  0.26	  	  
IMD	   	  0.28	  	   	  0.28	  	   	  0.26	  	   	  0.29	  	   	  0.26	  	   	  0.25	  	   	  0.27	  	   	  0.15	  	   	  0.13	  	   	  0.13	  	   	  0.17	  	   	  0.11	  	   	  0.17	  	   	  0.12	  	   	  0.17	  	  
WJP	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Figure 29 – Brazil Individual Indicators used to construct Control of Corruption 
(Kaufmann et al., 2014)	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  Figure	  30	  (Kaufmann	  et	  al.,	  2014)	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